Side Channel Analysis (SCA) is known to be a serious threat for cryptographic algorithms for twenty years. Recently, the explosion of the Internet of Things has increased the number of devices that can be targeted by these attacks, making this threat more relevant than ever. Furthermore, the evaluations of cryptographic algorithms regarding SCA are usually performed at the very end of a product design cycle, impacting considerably the time-to-market in case of security flaws. Hence, early simulations of embedded software and methodologies have been developed to assess vulnerabilities with respect to SCA for specific hardware architectures.
Aiming to provide an agnostic evaluation method, we propose in this work a new methodology of data collection and analysis to reveal leakage of sensitive information from any software implementation. Our solution takes inspiration from the work proposed by Bos et al. in . As an illustration our solution is used interestingly to break a white-box cryptography implementation.
 Joppe W. Bos, Charles Hubain, Wil Michiels, Philippe Teuwen: Differential Computation Analysis: Hiding Your White-Box Designs is Not Enough. CHES 2016.
I completed a PhD in March 2019, under the supervision of Dr. Sylvain Guilley, focused on side-channel analysis titled “Multidimensionality of the models and the data in the side-channel domain” delivered by TELECOM ParisTech (France). I joined the MAIS team in September 2019, as a postdoc researcher to participate in the Collaborative Research Center CROSSING (E3).
We will have lunch (pizza) together after the research seminar talk. Please register here: https://doodle.com/poll/z9se6ebsuttb54iu